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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 20010772-CA 
v. : 
TRACY MANUEL VALDEZ, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT OFFICER'S CONCERN 
FOR THEIR SAFETY DID NOT JUSTIFY INITIATION OF A LEVEL 
TWO ENCOUNTER 
At Point III of his brief, defendant asserts, as an alternative claim, that the officer 
safety exception did not justify initiating a level two encounter. Aple. Br. at 12-14. In 
support, defendant particularly cites State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270 
(attached at Addendum A). 
The State respectfully suggests that Warren is doubtful authority in support of 
defendant's claim. Defendant cites Warren for the basic proposition from Ohio v. Terry that 
'" [w]here a police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and 
reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may 
conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the individual to discover weapons that might be 
used against him.'" Aple. Br. at 12 (quoting Warren, 2001 UT App 346, at f 13 (emphasis 
in original) (quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985))).1 Thereafter, defendant 
repeatedly cites Warren. Aple Br. at 12-13. He first recites the rubric that "a mere 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not sufficient [to establish^! reasonable suspicion]." 
Aple. Br. at 12 (quoting Warren, 2001 UT App 346, atf 14) (citation omitted). Defendant 
then refers to Warren's delineation of two basic scenarios that may warrant a frisk, seizing 
on the first to develop his argument that there was an insufficient basis to believe that 
defendant might be armed. Aple. Br. at 13 (quoting Warren, 2001 UT App 346, at ^ [15 ("In 
the first [scenario], facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect and/or factual 
context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed[.]")).2 
The State, of course, does not dispute these basic propositions. However, defendant's 
repeated reference to Warren directly invokes the spirit of that case. As stated, the State 
respectfully suggests that Warren is doubtful authority in support of defendant's claim. In 
Warren, a police officer validly stopped a driver for a traffic violation after having observed 
the driver engaged in a brief conversation with another man at 4:45 a.m. in a deserted 
downtown area of Salt Lake City. Id. at ff2-4. Obtaining the driver's license, the officer 
noted that it had expired four years earlier. Id. at ^[2, 4. The driver asserted that he had a 
current license, but that it had been stolen. Id. at f4. After inquiring about the driver's 
1
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,92 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). 
2
 The State has fully treated the reasonableness of the officers' belief that 
defendant might be armed and their minimal intrusion to confirm or dispel that belief 
throughout the argument in it's opening brief. See Aplt. Br. at 7-27. 
2 
purpose in being in that area at that time and about the other man's identity, the officer 
checked the driver's license and learned that although it was current it had been suspended. 
Id. at ffl[ 5-6. The officer then directed the driver out of the car, apparently only to inform the 
driver that the car would be impounded and without intending to arrest him. Id. at ^ 6. 
However, when the driver exited the car, the officer conducted a frisk, during which a white 
plastic "twist," later identified as cocaine, fell from the driver's waist, and he was arrested. 
7</.atf7. 
Before trial, the defendant in Warren moved to suppress the discovery of the cocaine 
on the ground that the frisk was not justified by a reasonable belief that he was armed. Id. 
at [^8. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the frisk was justified by the 
officer's legitimate concern for his safety. Id. 
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's ruling. Id. at f 16. The Court 
particularly noted that at the suppression hearing the officer testified that he did not believe 
the defendant was armed when he frisked him. Id. The Court also found unpersuasive the 
State's arguments that the frisk was justified by the lateness of the hour, defendant's lying 
about his driver's license, and the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops. Id. at ffl[12, 16. 
Warren is substantially distinguishable from this case. First, the trial court implicitly 
recognized that the situation justified the officers' concerns for their safety at the outset of 
their encounter with defendant (R. 52, 54). As argued throughout the State's opening brief, 
see Aplt. Br. at 7-27, nothing in the officers' subsequent encounter with defendant alleviated 
3 
those concerns. Indeed, the officers discovered almost immediately after asking defendant 
to show his hands that he was lying about his identity, all in the midst of what was probably 
a felony arrest in which defendant was acting suspiciously. 
More importantly, the State respectfully contends that Warren expresses a somewhat 
depreciated view of the dangers confronted by police officers in their line of duty. Following 
this Court's reversal of the trial court's suppression ruling, the State petitioned for writ of 
certiorari on the narrow issue of whether this Court failed to apply, under the totality of the 
circumstances, governing law concerning the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops. Pet. 
at 1. The Utah Supreme Court has granted the State's petition. See Order, dated April 10, 
2002 (attached at Addendum B).3 While the narrow issue before the supreme court does not 
directly bear on the facts of this case, the general issue of officer safety presented is 
extremely relevant to the disposition of this case. As argued at length in the State's opening 
brief, the officers' concern for their safety was justified at the outset and never abated, all in 
circumstances suggesting at least as great an objective concern for safety as those in Warren. 
3
 As of current date, the State has filed its opening brief in State v. Warren, No. 
20020002-SC. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
Given the factual distinctions between this case and those in Warren, and the 
uncertainty of Warren's authority on the general issue of officer safety, this Court should 
decline to regard Warren as significant authority for defendant's claim that the officer safety 
exception did not justify initiating a level two encounter, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z^ day of July, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
5 
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Addendum A 
37P.3d270 
434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 2001 UT App 346 
(Cite as: 37 P3d 270) 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Eric Jarvis WARREN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20000495-CA. 
Nov. 16,2001. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Sheila K. McCleve, J., of possession 
of a controlled substance. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) police officer 
did not have any reasonable suspicion that defendant, 
who was cited for traffic violations, was armed to 
justify Terry frisk, and (2) remand to trial court was not 
appropriate to determine if seizure of cocaine and drug 
paraphernalia from defendant was justified under 
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Thorne, Jr., J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and 
filed an opinion. 
West Headnotes 
HI Criminal Law €=>1134(3) 
110k! 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
HI Criminal Law €=^1153(1) 
11 Okl 153(1) Most Cited Cases 
HI Criminal Law €=>1158(4) 
110k! 158(4) Most Cited Cases 
The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision 
to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are 
reviewed under the deferential clearly- erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the 
trial judge's application of the legal standard to the 
facts. 
121 Arrest €=>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
Where a police officer validly stops an individual for 
investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes 
Copr. ® West 2002 No Claim 
Paee9 
that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the 
officer may conduct a frisk or pat-down search of the 
individual to discover weapons that might be used 
against him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
131 Arrest €=^63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
Although it is not essential that an officer actually have 
been in fear to perform a Terry frisk, the State must 
present articulable facts that would reasonably lead an 
objective officer to conclude that the suspect may be 
armed; a mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch is 
not sufficient. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
1£ Arrest 0=>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
Facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect 
and/or factual contextmay give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion the suspect may be armed to warrant a Terry 
frisk, such as a suspect with a bulge in his clothing that 
appears to be a weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in 
denying that he is armed and aggressively approaches 
the officer immediately upon being stopped. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
151 Arrest €=*63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
If the inherent nature of the crime being investigated 
leads an officer to a reasonable suspicion that a suspect 
may be armed, a Terry frisk may be warranted. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
1£ Arrest €=^63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
Only where there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity and the nature of the crime suggests an 
increased likelihood that the suspect is armed can a 
frisk be justified. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
121 Automobiles €=^349.5(10) 
48Ak349.5(10) Most Cited Cases 
Police officer did not have any reasonable suspicion 
that defendant, who was cited for traffic violations, was 
armed to justify Terry frisk, where officer testified at 
suppression hearing that he did not believe defendant 
was armed at time he decided to frisk defendant. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Paee 10 
181 Criminal Law €==>394.1(3) 
110k394.1(3) Most Cited Cases 
181 Criminal Law C=>394.6(4) 
110k394.6(4) Most Cited Cases 
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the 
exclusionary rule; however, under the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, State has the burden to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the information 
ultimately would have been discovered by lawful 
means. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
121 Criminal Law €=>1181.5(7) 
110k! 181.5(7) Most Cited Cases 
Remand to trial court was not appropriate to determine 
if seizure of cocaine and drug paraphernalia from 
defendant was justified under inevitable discovery 
exception to exclusionary rule; no evidence in record 
could have sustained findings that police would have 
inevitably discovered
 r cocaine and paraphernalia. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmendr 4. 
*271 Catherine E. Lilly, Otis Sterling, III, and Heather 
Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Marian Decker, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before JACKSON. Associate P.J., and ORME and 
THORNE, Jr.. JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
U 1 Appellant Eric Jarvis Warren seeks to overturn his 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (SUPP.1999). Specifically, he 
contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress evidence he alleges was seized in violation of 
his Fourth Amendment rights. Warren argues that the 
evidence obtained from the police officer's search 
should have been suppressed because, inter alia, he was 
illegally frisked. The State counters with, among other 
things, the claim that the evidence would inevitably 
have been discovered. We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
^ 2 "Because a determination of the reasonableness of 
... police conduct is highly factual in nature, we review 
the facts in detail." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 86 
(Utah Ct.App.1987). On November 28, 1999, at 
approximately 4:45 a.m., Officer Nathan Swensen 
observed a grey Cadillac pulled over to the side of the 
road near the intersection of 200 South and 200 East 
streets in downtown Salt Lake City. Occupying the 
driver's seat of that vehicle was appellant Warren, a 
thirty-eight year old African-American male. Officer 
Swensen also observed another unidentified individual 
leaning into the front passenger's side door of Warren's 
car. 
f 3 Officer Swensen observed this activity for less than 
a minute, did not hear any of the conversation that took 
place, could not tell what the two people were doing, 
and did not recognize the vehicle or individuals from 
prior encounters. Nonetheless, Officer Swensen 
assumed that Warren and the unidentified individual 
were engaged in a transaction involving either drugs or 
prostitution. Officer Swensen testified that he based 
his suspicion on the fact that it was early in the morning 
and there were no open businesses or residences in the 
vicinity. Despite his suspicions, Officer Swensen did 
not then approach Warren's vehicle or the unidentified 
man, who departed on foot. 
f 4 Officer Swensen then observed Warren pull away 
from the curb and make a left turn onto 200 South, 
followed by a lane change, without signaling. Officer 
Swensen pulled Warren over after observing the traffic 
violation. He requested Warren's driver's license and 
vehicle registration. Warren readily provided the 
requested materials. Officer Swensen noticed that the 
license had expired in 1995. Warren explained that he 
had a current license, but that it had been stolen. 
f 5 Officer Swensen then set about to ascertain why 
Warren was out at that time of night and what he had 
been doing with the unidentified man. He asked 
questions regarding who the unidentified man was, what 
they were doing, and whether Warren had dropped the 
man off or just met him. Warren responded by telling 
Officer Swensen that his mother and the man's mother 
were acquaintances and that he dropped the man off 
after they had been together at someone's house. 
Warren also indicated that he had been looking for 
packing boxes for his sister, who was moving. Officer 
Swensen's questioning lasted approximately two 
minutes. Officer Swensen conceded at the suppression 
hearing that these questions were unrelated to and 
unnecessary for the proper effectuation of the traffic 
stop. 
*272 If 6 Officer Swensen returned to his patrol car, 
checked Warren's license, and learned that it was 
otherwise current but had been suspended for failure to 
pay reinstatement fees. Officer Swensen then decided 
to impound Warren's car. He asked Warren to get out 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works 
Pa°e 11 
of the car to sign citations for failure to signal and for 
driving without a valid license. Officer Swensen 
testified he did not intend to arrest Warren and only had 
him exit the vehicle to inform him about the impound 
and to sign the citations. 
% 7 When Warren was out of the car, Officer Swensen 
frisked him. He did not believe that Warren was armed 
or dangerous, but frisked him as a matter of routine. 
fFNll A white plastic "twist," later identified as 
cocaine, fell from Warren's waist during the frisk, 
whereupon Warren was arrested. An inventory search 
of Warren's car uncovered a knife concealed under the 
armrest, and a more in-depth search of Warren's person, 
incident to arrest, led to the discovery of more cocaine 
and a glass pipe. 
FN1. In fact, when asked, the officer testified 
that his reasons for the frisk were "(j]ust from 
training, and for my safety, and everybody that 
was there, their safety. Whenever I pull 
somebody out of a car, I perform a Terry frisk 
just to see if there's weapons. Also because of 
the fact that with there being drug activity and 
prostitution and so on, people that are 
involved in that usually carry weapons. So 
with that in mind, also for the fact that I 
always do that, perform that Terry frisk when 
I pull somebody out of a car, that's why I did 
it." 
f 8 Warren moved to suppress the cocaine and pipe as 
evidence, claiming (1) that the scope of the detention 
and questioning went beyond the purpose of the traffic 
stop and (2) that the frisk was not justified by a 
reasonable suspicion that he was armed. The trial 
court denied the motion, concluding that the 
questioning was reasonable given the officer's personal 
observations and resulting suspicion. The court also 
ruled that the frisk was justified by the officer's 
legitimate concern for his safety. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f 9 The issues presented in this appeal are whether the 
trial court, in denying appellant's motion to suppress, 
correctly determined that (1) Officer Swensen properly 
extended the scope of the traffic stop beyond its 
original purpose and (2) the officer's search of Warren 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
j j j f 10 "The factual findings underlying a trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence 
are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the 
trial judge's application of the legal standard to the 
facts." State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah 
ClApp.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). 
1^11 The State argues that even if the actions of Officer 
Swensen violated Warren's Fourth Amendment rights, 
the case should be remanded to the trial court to 
determine if the evidence acquired from the 
investigation should nonetheless be admitted because it 
would inevitably have been discovered. 
I. LEGALITY OF FRISK 
K12 Warren argues that the evidence obtained from his 
person was inadmissible at trial because he was frisked 
absent any reasonable suspicion that he was armed. He 
points out that at the suppression hearing Officer 
Swensen testified he did not believe Warren to be 
armed at the time he decided to frisk him. The State 
insists that Officer Swensen's search of Warren was 
objectively reasonable under the Supreme Court's 
decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.88 S.Ct. 1868,20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). "[g]iven the circumstances of the 
traffic stop, including the deserted downtown area at an 
unusually early hour, defendant's lie about the validity 
of his license, and recognition that traffic stops are 
inherently dangerous." FFN21 
FN2. Apparently recognizing the lack of any 
articulable facts that would reasonably lead to 
an inference that Warren and his acquaintance 
were engaged in a drug or prostitution 
transaction, the State on appeal does not 
seriously press this angle as a basis for 
suspecting Warren was armed. 
£21K 13 The State's argument reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the Terry *273 holding, which is 
not nearly as open-ended as the State seems to suggest. 
In Terry, the Supreme Court established a narrowly 
drawn exception to the Fourth Amendment 
requirement that police obtain a warrant for all 
searches. Where a police officer validly stops an 
individual for investigatory or other purposes and 
reasonably believes that the indiyidual may be armed 
and dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" or 
"pat-down" search of the individual to discover 
weapons that might be used against him. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985) 
(emphasis added). 
[3] K 14 Although "[i]t is not essential that an officer 
actually have been in fear" to perform a Terry frisk, the 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Paee 
State must present articulable facts that would 
reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude that the 
suspect may be armed. W, "A mere unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch is not sufficient." Id. 
r4ir5H"61 ^ 15 Two basic scenarios may warrant a Terry 
frisk. In the first, facts and circumstances unique to the 
particular suspect and/or factual context may give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed, 
such as a suspect with a bulge in his clothing that 
appears to be a weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in 
denying that he is armed and aggressively approaches 
the officer immediately upon being stopped. See State 
v. Rochell 850 P.2d 480. 483 (Utah Ct.App.1993): 
Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 
252, 257 (3rd ed.1996). In the second scenario, it is 
not so much the peculiarities of the suspect and 
circumstances as it is the inherent nature of the crime 
being investigated that leads to the reasonable suspicion 
that the suspect may be armed. The leading treatise on 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence explains that while it 
may be reasonable for an officer to frisk a suspect who 
has been stopped based upon a suspicion that he is 
engaging in criminal activity for which an offender 
would likely be armed, it does not follow that officers 
are free to frisk any individual suspected of any crime. 
fFN31 See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure, § 
9.5(a), at 254-59 (3rd ed.1996). Crimes that, by their 
nature, suggest the presence of weapons include: 
"robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, 
homicide, and dealing in large quantities of narcotics." 
Id. at 255-56 (footnotes omitted). "But for other types 
of crimes, such as trafficking in small quantities of 
narcotics, possession of marijuana, illegal possession of 
liquor, prostitution, bookmaking, shoplifting, underage 
drinking, driving under the influence and lesser traffic 
offenses, minor assault without weapons, or vagrancy," 
there must be particular facts which lead the officer to 
believe that a suspect is armed. Id. at 256-57 
(footnotes omitted). 
likelihood that the suspect is armed can a frisk 
be justified. See id± State v. Carter. 707 
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) (authorizing the 
frisk of a burglary suspect who matched a 
police radio description because an officer 
could reasonably conclude that a burglary 
suspect might be carrying dangerous tools or 
weapons); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085. 
1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) (explaining that Terry frisk of 
suspect reasonably believed to be involved in 
moving large quantities of illegal drugs over 
long distances was justified). 
[I} % 16 Beyond his supposition that Warren and his 
unidentified companion were engaging in a transaction 
for either prostitution or drugs, Officer Swensen did not 
provide the trial court with any facts that justified a 
Terry frisk. The fact that Officer Swensen candidly 
admitted at the suppression hearing that he did not 
believe Warren was armed at the time he decided to 
frisk him clearly takes Officer Swensen's actions 
outside of Terry's limited justification for warrantless 
searches. Nor do the facts urged by the State on appeal 
to rationalize the frisk furnish the required foundation. 
fFN41 We therefore conclude *274 that the search 
violated Warren's Fourth Amendment rights, and the 
evidence obtained thereby should have been 
suppressed. fFN51 
FN4. See f 12, supra. As noted, "lesser 
traffic offenses" are not suggestive of 
weapons. Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and 
Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 256 (3rd ed.1996). Nor 
is the lateness of the hour. See id. at 260. 
Similarly, lying about the status of one's 
driver's license does not suggest the presence 
of weapons. 
FN3. This court has expressed an 
unwillingness to characterize a frisk as 
justified where the possibility of a crime being 
committed is speculative at best and the 
officer's suspicions do "not generally implicate 
an inherently dangerous situation or 
specifically indicate that the suspect [is] 
armed." State v. White, 856 P.2d 656.663-66 
(Utah CtApp. 1993) (holding that "unfounded 
allegations of attenuated domestic violence" 
and suspicion of cocaine use did not justify an 
immediate frisk). Only where there is a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and 
the nature of the crime suggests an increased 
FN5. Having concluded that the evidence 
obtained should have been suppressed due to 
the unlawfiil frisk, we need not address 
whether Officer Swensen also violated 
Warren's rights by impermissibly extending 
his questioning beyond the scope of the traffic 
stop. 
n. INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
£81TJ 17 The State argues that even if the search was 
unlawful, this case should be remanded to the trial court 
to determine if the seizure of cocaine and paraphernalia 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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from Warren's person was nonetheless justified under 
the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary 
rule. "Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the 
exclusionary rule[.]" State v. Tooanotes. 2000 UT Ann 
3115 10, 14P.3d695. However, under the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, the State has the burden to " 
'establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately would have been discovered by 
lawful means/ " Id^ (quoting State v. James, 2000 UT 
80516. 13 P.3d 576). 
[9] J 18 In making its argument, the State correctly 
points out that the trial court did not make findings of 
fact addressing this issue. The State argues the trial 
court should have the opportunity to do so now. 
However, in so arguing the State fails to recognize that 
this lack of findings relevant to inevitable discovery 
was not due to some lapse or oversight by the trial 
court, or even to a mistake of law. Rather, the State 
failed to timely advance the theory or present evidence 
to support it. 
f 19 Although the State bore the burden of proving that 
the evidence would inevitably have been discovered by 
lawful means, not one word about inevitable discovery 
was mentioned during the suppression hearing itself. 
No evidence in contemplation of that theory was 
introduced by the State, nor was it mentioned in the 
brief oral argument that concluded the hearing. Rather, 
the idea surfaced for the first time only in subsequent 
briefing and a later round of oral arguments when it was 
raised, with apologies for its untimeliness, by a different 
prosecutor than the one who handled the actual 
suppression hearing. 
% 20 Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in the 
record that would sustain findings in support of a 
determination that discovery of the drugs and 
paraphernalia on Warren's person would have been 
inevitable, along the lines theorized by the State on 
appeal, even had he not been frisked. Although the 
arresting officer did testify that he impounded Warren's 
car, there was no testimony that, following such 
impoundment, an inventory search of the vehicle would 
have been made. No testimony established the 
procedure, scope, and criteria of such a search, in 
accordance with preestablished departmental 
guidelines, so that the legality of such a search could be 
gauged. See generally State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 
425,426-27 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). The record contains 
no evidence showing that such a search would have 
uncovered the knife, much less that such discovery 
would have prompted further immediate contact with 
Warren. There was no testimony that the officers 
would have been able to quickly locate Warren after 
discovering the weapon, or that he still would have had 
narcotics and paraphernalia on his person at the time of 
any such later encounter. 
TI21 Because no evidence in the record would support 
findings establishing inevitable discovery, remand 
would be a meaningless gesture that should be avoided 
in the interest of judicial economy. In State v. Hazen, 
802 P.2d 745 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). rev'd on other 
grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992). affd. 510 U.S. 
399. 114 S.Ct. 958. 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). we 
explained that a remand is not appropriate where "there 
is simply no way [the] evidence [can] be 'weighed' by 
the trial court to come to the conclusion that the state 
[has] met its burden." Id. at 747. As in Hazen. there 
is no way in this case that the trial court, lacking any 
relevant evidence, could properly determine that the 
*275 police would have inevitably discovered the 
cocaine and pipe. See id. 
CONCLUSION 
% 22 Because when Officer Swensen frisked Warren he 
did not believe, and had no basis on which to 
reasonably conclude, that Warren might be armed, the 
frisk was unlawful. The evidence procured as a result 
of that frisk must be suppressed. Further, because the 
State failed to meet its burden to establish the discovery 
of the evidence was inevitable, that theory has long 
since been foreclosed. Remand for consideration of 
that theory's applicability at this late date cannot be 
justified in the complete absence of any evidence 
addressing inevitable discovery. Accordingly, we 
reverse and remand for a new trial or such other 
proceedings as may now be appropriate. 
f 23 I CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON. 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
THORNE. Jr.. Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part): 
f 24 I concur with the principle portion of the 
majority's opinion, however, I feel that deciding the 
issue of inevitable discovery at this level without 
permitting the trial court the opportunity to consider it 
is unwise. 
% 25 I agree that the record presented to this court is 
insufficient on its face to support a conclusion of 
"inevitable discovery." However, I disagree with the 
decision to foreclose any further examination of this 
issue in the name of "judicial economy," particularly 
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since, as the majority points out, it was not addressed 
below. The majority seems intent on establishing an ill 
conceived rule requiring the state to raise every possible 
argument in response to a motion to suppress. The 
majority would foreclose the possibility for additional 
evidence and additional argument directed at this 
specific question under the belief that the prosecution 
has had an opportunity to present such an issue, but 
chose not to, thereby surrendering the option to ever 
raise it again. 
K 26 In my experience, the question of "inevitable 
discovery" is often not ripe for discussion until and 
unless the trial court concludes that a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment has occurred. Further, until a trial 
court has reached such a conclusion, requiring such an 
effort would waste valuable resources for the parties 
and the trial courts. 
f 27 I believe both wisdom and precedent support a 
more balanced approach permitting further exploration 
of questions like "inevitable discovery" after a trial 
court has determined that the Fourth Amendment has 
been violated. See Murray v. United States. 487 U.S. 
533. 543, 108 S.Ct 2529, 2536. 101 L.Ed.2d 472 
(1988) (vacating the judgment and remanding the case 
for further hearings on the issue of the "independent 
source" doctrine, which had not been previously 
addressed); State v. Wazoner, 126 N.M. 9. 966 P.2d 
176. (Ct.App. 1998) (stating "[T]he district court made 
no findings, oral or written, regarding these issues. 
When the prosecutor began to argue for application of 
the inevitable-discovery exception, the district court cut 
him off by expressing its disapproval of the exception. 
Consequently, we must remand to the district court to 
determine whether the inevitable discovery exception 
applies to this case."), rev'd on other grounds, 130 
N.M. 274. 24 P.3d 306 (Ct.App.2001). fFNll 
FN1. If the trial court properly determines that 
the search did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, it would be wasted effort to also 
require that the court take evidence and make 
findings concerning inevitable discovery at the 
same time. 
K 28 Moreover, I also disagree with the majority's foray 
into findings of fact concerning this issue following our 
admission that the record is insufficient to fully address 
the issue. I believe that it is not our role to make 
findings of fact, and absent a proper finding of fact 
"application of the proper rule of law is difficult, if not 
impossible, and the reviewing function of this court is 
seriously undermined." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336. 1339 (Utah 1979). 
|^ 29 Accordingly, I make no judgment as to the 
ultimate determination of whether the evidence in this 
particular matter would have inevitably been 
discovered, but I would permit the trial court to receive 
additional evidence *276 and hear additional argument 
on the question. Moreover, I do not believe the 
majority is correct in stating that "remand would be a 
meaningless gesture that should be avoided in the 
interest of judicial economy." Therefore I dissent. 
37 P.3d 270, 434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 2001 UT App 
346 
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Addendum B 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Petitioner, 
Eric Jarvis Warren, 
Respondent, 
No. 20020002-SC 
20000495-SC 
991923384 
ORDER 
This matter is- before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
filed on January 2, 2002, by petitioner is granted. 
/ 
Date 
PC 1/ ~) 
FOR THE COURT: 
Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
